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DEFENSE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS: OLD AND NEW MISSIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

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1. New Concepts on Defense Policy
— A Theoretical Perspective

Defense policy nowadays is not only about military engagement, but also about diplomacy and prevention. States and military establishments have experienced a transition from a Cold War deterministic classical threats-oriented organizations to an evolving-processes approach in which internal factors, risks perceptions, society, mathematics of defense policy weigh as much as the objective evolutions of the international environment.

As Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden put it "in the Cold War period any assessment of force requirements began with a threat analysis. Today such assessments are more about risks and needs"[1] and the process of finding an appropriate balance between the two.

With the decrease in probability of military threat to European security, we experienced in the last decade an increase in instability and crisis phenomena at sub-regional level, fragmentation or isolation of some state actors, diversity of non-military and non-conventional risks and

threats, low intensity conflicts engaging state and non-state actors, negative developments at domestic level generated by social, economic issues, civil emergencies etc. Globalization growing interdependencies, post-industrial technologies development, creation of new coalitions of willing and changes in traditional security international institutions mingled with the subsistence of underdeveloped regions, authoritarian regimes, classical balance of power thinking and old-fashioned state institutions. Democratic states use military establishments to promote in different forms democratic principles and values and the military engagement in its broader sense takes new shapes and meanings. Even the concept of war has gained new meanings and dimensions, hard to imagine some years ago, as the fight against terrorism demonstrates.

The juxtaposition between security and defense, that has been characteristic to the Cold War has moved to a different pattern: while defense remains a subsystem of security policies, both concepts have acquired a larger significance. As security implies presently a spectrum of features ranging from political, social and economical fields, correspondingly defense has dilated and this has generated ineluctably additional missions for the armed forces.

2. Old and New Missions

At the beginning of this century, we might say, in Clausewitzian terms, that defense policy is not any more only the continuation of security strategies with military means. Defense is perceived as primarily military in nature, but the role of armed forces has particularly changed in the previous years. Classical deterrence has translated into complex cooperation engagements, armed conflicts have taken the shape of subregional crisis and identities bargaining, nations have found new ways of expressing and pursuing their objectives and interests. Also, classical territorial defense has moved to defending interests and principles that define state functioning, in which homeland protection includes sometime civil and internal security missions. As Arnold Wolths noted security connotes the "absence of threat to acquired values"[2]. Security and defense imply more than ever a problem of values and perceptions about them.

Has national security and military ontology to be redefined with respect to these metamorphoses? Or, instead, we will only have to deal with a simple reorientation of defense policy priorities that are to be managed with the same traditional institutional tools? Probably, both alternatives are at least partially true. Louis W. Goodman noted in this respect:

"While the end of international ideological conflict has lead to widespread acceptance of democracy and capitalism, the need for combat - ready armed forces has not disappeared. The national - security imperatives at the close of the century are often described as "more diverse" than those that faced the international community during the Cold War.(…) Since armed forces cannot be assembled on short notice - especially given the contemporary need for

rapid deployment, integration of military systems, and full operational capacity among international allies - long term investment in national defense is still required." [3]

At the global level, the persistence of balance-of-power motivations dictate that conventional forces be ready to engage in conventional conflicts, while the resurgence of a system dedicated to peace, as a goal in itself, produces additional missions for the armed forces [4]. It is commonly accepted that we live in a period of exceptionality in which a major war is becoming obsolete.

Revolutions in international affairs rarely occur. But, as revolutions do occur (end of Cold War, 11th of September), there is always continuity and discontinuity in respect to any such new developments in international relations. This is even truer in the field of security. We mustn't be too idealistic in thinking that deterrence has been completely replaced by cooperative or collective security, that conflict is being substituted by norms and cooperation or that the "classical" military is suddenly becoming an organization oriented towards administration, policing or nation building. Conversely we should not be too pessimistic (or too "realistic") to state that the sole laws of international relations are that of power, balance of power and geopolitics, in which the armies play only the classical role of conducting wars. The military will continue to conduct wars, but will also manage difficult crisis and negative evolutions in missions other than war [5].

Although we live in a continental environment where there is no threat or intention to go to war, military power will still probably play a major role as confirming a long-term commitment to regional stability. As Daniel Nelson [6] affirmed "military force is explained and rationalized to democratic citizens as an act of defense - defending principles if not territory".

Among the new missions classical Suez-type peace keeping has diversified into a large crisis management spectrum from enforcement to peace building and humanitarian assistance. Collective security has evolved into a broader concept, encompassing preventive diplomacy tools and balancing non-traditional threats by a common effort. As an example, NATO Strategic Concept is focusing on promoting peace and stability, as much as on ensuring strict collective defense capabilities. Another new role for the armed forces is related to the desirability of democracy and self-government, involving the types of intervention that require ensuring respect of democratic rules, exercising basic police functions, resettling populations and election supervision. Also the armed forces could involve in providing the basic material needs of a population that went out of a devastating crisis, from infrastructure and house building, to food and medical supplies. With respect to emerging asymmetric threats, the military has already been involved at home and abroad in fighting organized crime groups, a task that is much related to daily maintenance of law and order, and that caused additional questions and concerns about civil control over the armed forces [7]. Finally, one of the most ambitious mission armed forces in international coalition has assumed, has been related to nation building, while domestic anarchy had to

be replaced by imposed democracy in a sort of "civilizing mission" (case of Somalia).

It is not to say that what we call non-traditional missions are "brand new". The human history experienced previously the involvement of regular armies in civil security missions or in organized crime fighting. But after a period of deterrence strategies designed to meet a major power's war, our armies have been shaped as massive conventional forces, able to sustain themselves and to be engaged in a large scale conflict. The shift to peacekeeping and peacemaking has stressed the importance of flexible, modern, professional and smaller capabilities.

What could be probably considered as new in its substance is the need for sustained prolonged involvement that both peacekeeping and peace making required. Previous brief "expeditionary" operations are obviously not enough to cover the long-term involvement necessary to deal with complex situations that range from Balkans to Lebanon or Afghanistan. Of course the end state of all military action has remained the demilitarization of the problem and new contingencies are to be pursued in respect of the existing laws on war conduct and principles of human rights[8].

In this respect another question that arose is to what extend the servicemen are able or recommended in carrying out a peace effort from its beginning to its end. At what moment should they be replaced completely by policemen and administrative bodies and what are the limits in military involvement, both from a temporal and rules of engagement' perspective?

Secondly, operational tasks and conduct of those missions on the ground had supplemented the difficulties

posed to regular armed forces deriving from the complexity of local environments. While sovereignty is slipping away from indigenous governments to other actors, while opponents may take the shape of street gangs or ideological zealots, how is the servicemen supposed to act with respect to the inner implementation of international conventions on human rights[9]?

Determining the appropriate limits of military involvement influences the very core of civil - military relations, as military service is still about basic values of loyalty, hierarchy, unity and respect of senior level decisions, in Huntington terms "expertise, responsibility and corporateness"[10].

Although acquiring high tech capabilities, missile defense and new technologies have proved to be useful, they are insufficient *per se* in sustaining such operations that are often carried out with conventional type forces. On the other hand, in such multinational management of complex contingencies, forces' integration, jointness, modularity and flexibility in carrying out operations have become mandatory in Euro-Atlantic defense strategies.

In this context it is not tautological to reiterate that defense is only a part in a larger security picture, where adaptable shifts in the balance between means (diplomatic, economic, military, social) become an intrinsic part of the engagement.

3. Romania's Case: Planning the Defense Policy

For countries in Eastern Europe, finding the appropriate balance between threats and capacities in planning the

defense has been a challenging issue. Transition makes the focus on resources compulsory, but also have an embroiling effect on risk evaluation. Moving towards a world where military threats diminish creates a major problem: how the military institution is to deal with mostly non-military, non-conventional risks? What are the required capabilities or if so, is the military institution becoming less relevant for a state security?

Romania has been engaged in an extensive downsizing process since the beginning of 1990. "From then until the end of 1996, an average of 14,000 military were released every year. Since 1997, an annual average of 17,000 to 18,000 personnel has been cut. Officially numbering 320,000 at the time of the revolution (…), the Romanian armed forces were cut to 143,028 by the end of 2000"[11] - all figures including conscripts. Military personnel on active duty was approximately 102,000 at the end of 2001. Defense plans have been developed ever since to increase the number of professional military and to re-shape the entire force system.

Romania has taken a first regulatory step with the adoption in 1998 of a top-down defense planning system aimed at setting up security and defense policy development, balancing ways and resources and improving transparency of military transformations.

Defense planning has followed a national approach based on an adapted *PPBES* (Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System), orchestrating the main state institutions role and responsibilities. Our *PPBES* or the *"R"-PPBES* has been conceptualized and developed to embody the existing institutional and strategic specificity of Romanian military.

The planning agenda included the adoption of 1999 *National Security Strategy*, including an assessment on risks and threats and different ways of actions in foreign affairs, internal security and defense. On the basis of this strategy provisions, a *White Paper on national security and defense* was produced at the governmental level with the aim of coordinating sectorial policies and strategies with an overall assessment of available resources for increasing the country security. Both documents stated that there is no major military threat to the country's security, established as a major goal the integration in NATO and EU and asserted the preference towards using preventive diplomatic and military means, as being less expensive and more effective on the long run. The *Military Strategy* has defined new missions for the armed forces from crisis management to the participation in defense diplomacy tools (*CSBM*'s, regional cooperation initiatives, bilateral arrangements etc).

As the gate was opened, a second step currently envisaged is the system development and adaptation to strategic evolutions and requirements. A second *National Security Strategy* was approved by the Parliament on the 18th of December 2001. This presidential document includes a broader vision on what security means, including other non-classical fields of action such as reform of the public administration, education or social system and involvement of the civil society in policy debates. Also it takes

into account a larger "spectrum of risks"[12], including challenges and internal vulnerabilities, in order to enlarge and adapt security and defense system in facing new tasks. Further emphasis has been added to Romania's participation in cooperative security arrangements. Moreover, new formalizations of Romania's security are embracing the goal of increasing the health and well being of individuals as a dimension of and a scale for the State security[13].

In the summer of 2001, the *Defense Planning Guidance* as the main tool for resources allocation was revised (according to legal provisions, the guidance is to be revised annually, while other planning documents have a four year term and a 4-8 years evaluation perspective). As the Guidance stated, starting with 2002, defense budget will be developed on 8 major programs, in the direct responsibility of 8 program managers.

The planning system also provided the framework for institutional changes within the Defense Ministry with a clear division of responsibilities between civilian and military structures. As policy and resources planning are in civilian management, subsequent strategic, operational and acquisition planning are tasked to the General Staff.

As stated before, armed forces role has to be positioned in a broader security picture, where clear delimitation of responsibilities among different agencies is vital. Following 11 September events, it was affirmed the need for a functional crisis management system at the national level, with the appropriate connections with international organizations[14]. Although internal regulations for the state bodies cooperation in emergency situations do exist, a more comprehensive framework is currently under analysis to meet the new security requirements. It encompasses the precise regulations on the participation of armed forces in internal security under strict civilian control (including for example border protection or counter-terrorism, beyond a certain level of magnitude) and civil emergencies missions. As there is no single solution to this, the internal discussion on the shape of a national system for crisis management is still open. The configuration of national crisis management system opens further conceptual debates and reassessments about the role and place of armed forces within the security system and the society. Cooperation between the Romanian MoD and other state bodies should start with the evaluation of military role in the light of the already mentioned evolutions in the relation between security and defense. As so, armed forces will become a tool for extended security promotion: " A security and defense army is not a military exclusively shaped for war, but a vehicle of security and confidence building and preventive actions for peace and stability consolidation at regional and global level"[15].

4. Romania's Armed Forces. New Capabilities fot the New Missions

The missions of the armed forces have been derived from four correlated defense policy objectives: integration in NATO and EU; finalizing the reform process in order to acquire modern, flexible and sustainable defense capabili-

ties; developing the mechanisms for civil and democratic oversight; and improving Romania's status as a security provider through maintaining and increasing its contribution to regional stability.

Shaping the content of those planning provisions, a number of force reviews were conducted in recent years. The first was performed in 1997 and was called FARO (Romanian Armed Forces) 2005-2010. It stated the necessity of force reduction until 112 000 military personnel and of the increase in combat capabilities, training and education, along with achieving interoperability with NATO forces in terms of standards and procedures, and the broader capacity of acting together. Also it stated the need to pursue a two-step approach, focusing firstly on restructuring and then, after this one is completed, on modernization programs. FARO also established a new operational division of forces, taking into account the type of missions they were designed for.

Since then, other reviews have adapted the conceptual framework including new force building elements. At the beginning of this year, the Supreme Council for Defense has approved a more detailed allocation of forces for each mission, in which the Armed Forces are structured on **Active Forces** - organized on Surveillance and Early Warning and Crisis Reaction Forces (Immediate and Rapid Reaction); **Territorial Forces** (with low- reaction capabilities) and **Reserve Forces**. The Active Forces includes now a package of capabilities designed for participation in Art 5-type missions. Also, some additional priorities were added

with respect to modernizing communication and infrastructure, improving and integrating air space management into those of the Alliance, providing host nation support capabilities.

The new provisions aimed at enhancing the capacity to meet new missions requirements - jointness, interoperability and rapid deployment. A Doctrine for Joint Multinational Operations was approved on 6th of September 2001.

The Romanian armed forces missions includes:
- Defense of Romania's national territory, integrity, independence, sovereignty and constitutional democracy.
- Future participation in NATO collective defense missions
- Prevention or participation in crisis prevention, while the crisis is affecting the national and allied security
- Participation in peace support operations, including NATO-led CRO and EU-led Petersberg missions
- Participation alongside other national forces and institutions in counteracting the nonmilitary risks to national security.
- Cooperation with civil authorities in civil or other domestic emergencies.

These missions were also analyzed with respect to the probability of their occurring in order to develop future modernization and reform priorities. As it is obvious, involvement in peace support operations and civil emergencies management are presumably the most probable missions for Romania's armed forces, together with con-

tinuous participation in preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Therefore, as the number of Territorial and Reserve Forces went down, the focus in restructuring, modernizing and training was set on early warning forces, immediate reaction forces and rapid reaction forces. Defense diplomacy, even though it is a new expression, covers in a changed environment, renewed old tasks for the army: cooperation and exchange of information, promotion of shared values through common projects and initiatives etc. Thus it is more simple to understand and pursue than military involvement in operations other-than-war, even if both missions finally require the implementation of a common set of procedures, linguistic and operational standards. Direct participation in peace support operations and PfP exercises have proven to be valuable tools for on-the-ground training. Moreover the Military Strategy gave a particular attention to improving CIMIC capabilities, while a CIMIC doctrine is currently under discussion.

Romania has sought to increase the number of professional soldiers in its armed forces, while decreasing progressively in number of conscripts. By now legal contracts for military service have become regular practices as Romania moved towards liberal democracy mechanisms. No ultimate decision was taken on complete professionalization, as it is still considered that conscription is a national tradition, an educational tool as well as a pool for future contract military personnel.

5. Adjusting and Balancing Military Missions

Involving in multinational processes and initiatives, sustaining a number of forces abroad, maintaining at an adequate level the homeland defense troops need a standing financial effort that has to be pursued in a dynamic process of balancing between threats and capacities [16]. While the *other* or the enemy has become more elusive, less and less distinguished from ourselves, resources are visibly tighten by the economic transition countries in Eastern Europe, such as Romania, are engaged in. The need for clearly explaining to taxpayers, parliamentarians and servicemen what defense is about in this century has increased. While consensus is already built on the necessity of joining NATO, still responsibilities and tasks deriving from membership are to be learned. Romania discovered from other members' experience that assuming new missions and commitments is only a first step towards a deeper transformation of the military system.

Current analysis on force structure is dealing with going down from the strategic missions to operational acquisition and force planning priorities on the medium term. To what extend the armed forces are to be integrated in NATO structures after accession and beyond, what will be the role and the weight of the three services in the new force structure, what are the capabilities Romania ought to develop in order to provide a further effective contribution to regional security? The current government has committed itself to sustain no less than 2% of GDP for defense and, with regard to this effort we ought to make a better value for the money in finding the appropriate balance between size, training and modernization of the armed forces. In this endeavor, planning scenarios are to be perfected by using

combined multiple-type contingencies and avoiding former worst case blueprints.

While adapting the forces to the new missions, we come to realize that it is compulsory for a defense planning system to keep an open, tailored perspective for adjusting and adapting ongoing force building plans, according to the evolutions in the security environment.

As previously stated, building a security and defense military requires greater flexibility with regard to the missions to be assumed, the capabilities to be sustained and the resources to be allocated. Although main defense tasks for the military have remained the same, security missions, in the broadest sense - from the use of defense diplomacy to individuals safekeeping and preservation of peace - ask for a serious conceptualization of the role, shape and future of our armed forces.

"The army has to get used to the idea that its entire basis for operation and even existence has been changed fundamentally. In the meantime, society has to understand that it has to build up and nourish a new kind of army" [17].

NOTES:

1. Michael Alexander and Timothy Garden - "The arithmetic of defense policy", in *International Affairs*, 77, 3 (2001), p.510
2. Arnold Wolths- "National Security as an ambiguous symbol", *Political Science Quarterly*, vol.67, no.4, December 1952
3. Louis W. Goodman - "Military Roles, Past And Present", in "Civil Military Relations and Democracy", in Larry Diamond and Marc E. Plattnereds, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996, p.33. See also "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement", Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1994, pp.8-13.
4. For a detailed analysis on the current and future use of military force see George H. Quester - "Nontraditional uses of military force" in Richard H. Shultz Jr., Roy Godson, George H. Quester eds.- "Security studies for the 21ˢᵗ century", Virginia, Brassey's, 1997, pp.131-147.
5. For an analysis on new missions, see also Chris Donnely - "Shaping soldiers for the 21ˢᵗ century", *NATO Review,* 2000, no.2, pp.28-31.
6. Daniel Nelson - "Beyond defense planning", paper presented at the Workshop on Transparency in Defense Policy, Military Budgeting and Procurement, Sofia, Bulgaria, 17-20 May 2001 .
7. Peter Andreas et al. "Dead-end drug wars", *Foreign Policy* 85, Winter 1991-1992, pp.106-128.
8. Patrick Mileham and Lee Willett, eds, "Military ethics for the expeditionary era", London, Royal Institute of International Affairs/Brookings Institution, 2001.
9. Patrick Mileham - "But will they fight and will they die?", *International Affairs* 77, 3 (2001) p.621.
10. Samuel Huntington - "The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil - Military Relations", the Belknap Press of Cambridge University, Cambridge, Massachusets, 1957, pp.8-12.

11. Larry Watts - "The crisis in Romanian civil-military relations", *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol.48, no.4, July/August 2001.

12. In the sense used by Henry C. Bartlett and Paul G. Holman Jr. - "The spectrum of conflict: what can it do for force planners?", Strategy and Force Planning, Naval War College, Newport, RI 1995, pp.494-504.

13. For definition and concepts on *human security*, see Michael Klare and Daniel Thomas, (eds.) - "World Security: trends and challenges at century's end", St. Martin Press, New York, 1991.

14. In this context a meeting was organized on 17th of October by the Ministry of Defense aimed at determining how a crisis management system is going to be developed, including a discussion on improving the system of relations between Romania's security institutions and ministries.

15. George Maior - "Romanian Armed Forces - A new structure for a changed Alliance", *Observatorul Militar*, 25th of September 2001.

16. For a detailed analysis on the subject, see Daniel Nelson - "Great powers, global insecurity", in Michael Klare and Jogesh Chandrani, eds. "Global Security: Challenges for the 21th Century", New York, Basic Books, 2000.

17. Chris Donnely - "Defence transformation in the new democracies: A framework for tackling the problem", *NATO Review,* no.1 /1997, pp.15-19, *www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9701-4.htm.*

ANNEX 1

Romanian Forces Available for P.S.O.

Army
- 1 paratroops company (33 soldiers)
- 3 infantry companies (13 x 144 = 432 soldiers)
- 1 engineer company (21 soldiers)
- 1 mountain troops company (136 soldiers)
- 1 military police company (1123 soldiers)
- 1 demining squad (40 soldiers)

Air Forces
- 4 MIG - 21 Lancer (80 soldiers)
- 1 C - 130B - Transport (148 soldiers)

Navy
- 1 frigate (280 soldiers)
- 1 mine dredger (80 soldiers)
- 1 intervention ship with divers (65 soldiers - 45 crew and 20 divers)
- 1 tug boat (170 soldiers)
- 2 armored river vessels (65 + 50 = 115 soldiers)
- 1 river tug boat (115 soldiers)
- 1 diver team EOD/SEAL (24 soldiers)

From the nominated forces for P.S.O., Romania has the capacity to sustain in the field, in 2002, forces up to 400 soldiers.

ANNEX 2

Nominated Forces for Possible Colective Defense Missions

Forces category and Year	2001	2002	2003
Army Force	1 infantry battalion	1 infantry battalion 1 mountain troops company (SAR) 1 paratroops company	1 mechanized brigade 1 mountain troops company (SAR) 1 paratroops company
Air Force	4 MIG 21 Lancer	6 MIG 21 Lancer	8 MIG 21 Lancer 4 attack helicopters IAR 330 SOCAT
Navy Force	1 frigate 2 armoured river vessels with artillery 1 diver team EOD/SEAL	1 frigate 3 armoured river vessels with artillery 1 diver team EOD/SEAL	1 frigate 4 armoured river vessels with artillery 1 diver team EOD/SEAL

ANNEX 3

Romania's Participation in Regional Military Cooperation Initiatives

I. Operational Initiatives

Romanian-Hungarian Joint Peacekeeping Batalion

- In **January 1997**, the Romanian Ministry of National Defence launched the proposal to establish this unit. Agreement signed in Budapest, **20.03.1998**.
- The battalion became **operational** on 01.01.2000.
- **Tasks**: peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions under UN or OSCE mandate, led by the NATO or EU.
- **Participants**: Romania and Hungary.
- **Romanian contribution**: a module of the 191st Infantry Battalion (449 soldiers).
- Every year the command of this battalion is changed. On 27th September 2001 Romania took over the command of the battalion.

Multinational Stand-By forces High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG)

- The cooperation is based on the "UN Stand-by Arrangements System" (UNSAS) to which **Romania acceded in September 1997**.
- Availability of the force: starting with **01.01.2002**.
- **Members**: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands,

Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden signed all documents which give them the status of full membership. Argentina retired starting with 1ˢᵗ January 2002.

- **Countries that signed part of the documents**: Finland (contributes with troops), Spain, Portugal, Slovenia.
- **Observers**: Czech Republic, Hungary, Jordan, Ireland, Senegal.
- **Romanian contribution**:
    - 1 infantry company;
    - Up to 11 staff officers and NCOs;
    - 46,000 USD - Romanian annual shares for FY 2001; Romanian annual shares for FY 2002 will be 48,900 USD.

Multinational Peace Force in South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE)

- The proposal for its establishment was launched within the South-East Defence Ministerial Process (**SEDM**), in **Sofia**, on **03.10.1997**.
- **Participants**: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, FYROM, Romania and Turkey.
- **Observers**: Croatia, Slovenia and United States.
- **Objectives**: further development of cooperation and dialogue on regional security and stability in South Eastern Europe, fostering good neighborly relations among the countries in the region. The MPFSEE was created under the SEDM (South-Eastern Europe Defense Ministerial) process auspices.
- **MPFSEE comprises two elements**:
    A. **Political-Military Steering Committee** (**PMSC**), as the political-military decision-making body of the MPFSEE. Starting with 1 September 2001, Romania took over the Presidency of the PMSC, for 2 years.
    B. **South Eastern Europe Brigade** (**SEEBRIG**)
- On 01.05.2001, **SEEBRIG** became **fully operational**.
- It represents the operational "arm" of MPFSEE along with the Engineer Task Force (ETF).
- **Tasks**: peace support operations under UN or OSCE mandate as stipulated by the Security Council resolutions, based on the UN Chart.
- **Romanian contribution**:
    - 1 infantry battalion on module structure (400 military personnel);
    - 1 reconnaissance platoon (24 military personnel);
    - 1 transportation platoon (32 military personnel);
    - staff officers and NCOs group (15 military personnel);
    - 1 engineering company (121 military) - within the ETF;
    - 36,636 USD, Romanian annual shares for the financial year 2002.

Starting with September 2003, **Romania will host SEEBRIG HQ** (Constantza) for a 4 year period.

Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR)

- The Chiefs of Defense met in Brussels, in 1998, and decided to establish in this area a force similar to that already existing in the Baltic Sea.
- **Aim**: to enhance confidence and mutual understanding between the participating countries and to develop cooperation and interoperability between their naval forces; search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, de-mining and envi-

ronment protection operations.
- **Members**: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation, Turkey and Ukraine.
- **Romanian contribution**: 1 ship and staff officers ("on-call force").
- **BLACKSEAFOR** is to be activated at least once per year, being made up of 4-6 ships (destroyer, corvette, patrol vessel, mine sweeper, amphibious boat or auxiliary ship type).

South-Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial Process (SEDM Process)

- The 1ˢᵗ SEDM Meeting was held in Tirana (**March 1996**), but in starting this process, the major impulse was given by the SEDM Meeting in Sofia (**October 1997**).
- **Tasks**: Strengthening stability and security in South Eastern Europe.
- **Members**: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYROM, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, and US. Ukraine obtained the observer's status only at the SEDM meetings.
- **Key projects**:
To create a Communication Information Network of the SEDM countries (CIN/CIS):
- **Aim**: to create a viable, cost effective and interoperable network to provide information for crisis management and for CIMIC relation improvement in crisis situations.
To create an Engineer Task Force of the SEDM countries (ETF):
- **Aim**: to enhance regional cooperation and stability by being involved in common specific projects depending on the regional requirements - humanitarian crises and civil assistance, in case of disasters. The engineer forces of each

SEDM country are deployed on their own national territory, and in case of intervention, command and control are to be exercised inside SEEBRIG, parallel with it or independently, at the level of each country.
- **Romania's contribution**: 1 Eng Coy.
To create a South-Eastern Europe Simulation Network (SEESIMNET):
- **Aim**: to provide the architecture needed for organizing computer assisted exercises (CAX) and other needs of information management as well as means of responding to real crisis situations. SEESIMNET is seen as a regional application of the PfP simulation network; in 2002, a demonstration exercise will be held to verify the network viability (SEESIM DEMO and Exercise).
To create a network for interconnecting the military hospitals (possibly the civil ones, as well) of the SEDM countries (SIMIHO):
- **Aim**: to create a Tele medicine network of the military hospitals of the SEDM countries, in order to use communication information systems for lending medical assistance.
- **Romania's contribution**: in conformity with the MOU (under negotiating by technical, medical and legal experts), each SEDM country will designate a hospital for exercising the Tele medicine via satellite.
- The **SEDM Coordination Committee** (**SEDM-CC**) manages all projects initiated within this process.
- **Romania took over the Presidency of SEDM-CC on 1ˢᵗ September 2001, for 2 years, until 2003. The priorities of the Presidency are the following**:
    1. Improving SEDM contribution to security and stability in SE Europe;
    2. Maintaining the transparent and open character of the

initiate as to admitting new members in SEDM;

3. Enhancing the SEDM cooperation framework in order to address non-conventional and non-military challenges to regional security;

4. Creating favorable diplomatic and military conditions for an enhanced involvement of partner countries in crisis management endeavors in SE Europe;

5. Developing and implementing SEDM cooperation programs;

6. Improving the military training in the region;

7. Finalizing the process of making operational the MPFSEE.

II. In-Progress Negotiating Initiatives

Central European Nations' Cooperation in Peace Support (CENCOOP)

- In **1998**, Austria put forward an initiative to improve the regional cooperation among the Central-European countries, according to the UN Stand-By Arrangements.
- **Aim**: to make contribution in enhancing the capability of the participating nations to meet more efficiently in crisis management operations, in line with the EU European Security and Defence Policy and with those related to the creation of an European Security and Defence Identity within NATO.
- **Members**: Austria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Switzerland.
- **Juridical Documents**:
  - There is no juridical framework of cooperation;
  - The participating states signed only the "Letter of Intent" which also includes the "Framework Document for CENCOOP" (Vienna, 19.03.1998).
  - At the Defence Ministers Meeting (Bratislava, 21-22.06.2001), the "**Resolution concerning the Further Development of Central European Nations Cooperation in Peace Support** (**CENCOOP**)" was signed. The "**Terms of Reference of the Steering Committee**", "**Declaration on the Areas of Priority**" and "**Procedure for the Accession to CENCOOP by Interested Countries**" were approved.
- **Remarks**:

In June 2000, Austria changed its own approach concerning CENCOOP. The key works were **no** legally binding documents, **no** permanent structures, **no** preestablished / designated forces, and **no** common budget.

- **Priorities of cooperation at CENCOOP level**: information exchanges; create a pool of forces for humanitarian operations; create a pool of military observers for crisis management operations; create a pool of military police.
- Romania has got 2 non-permanent military representatives (Chief, National Planning Cell and his Deputy) in **PLANSTAFF/CENCOOP**.
- At the 9th **CENCOOP Steering Committee Meeting** (Bratislava-Slovakia, November 7-8, 2001), there were approved the **Terms of Reference for Director PLANSTAFF** and the **PLANSTAFF Working Program for 2002**. The Presidency of CENCOOP was taken over by Slovenia. Regarding the request of **Ukraine** to get an observer status and that of **Croatia** to become a CENCOOP member, a consensus was not reached.

- Slovenia took over the PLANSTAFF/CENCOOP Presiden-
cy from Slovakia, for 1 year (2002).

The Multinational Engineer Battalion Between Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine ("TISA" Battalion)

- At the trilateral meeting of the ministers of defense from
Romania, Ukraine and Hungary (Ujgorod/Ukraine, 15.01.
1999), the Ukrainian minister proposed the establishment
of a joint engineer unit in the Tisa river area.
- Tasks: intervention in natural disaster situations in the Tisa
river area.
- Juridical documents: The "Agreement between the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Slovakia and the Government of
the Republic of Hungry and the Government of Romania
and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine concerning the
establishment of the multinational engineer battalion" will
be renegotiated on a date that will be convened upon.
- Activities in 2001:
    - Except Hungary, the other three countries have been
      prepared to finalize this project in 2001. This unit
      could be operational during the second part of the year
      2002.
    - On 29-30.08.2001 (Kiev, Ukraine), during the Deputy
      Chiefs of General Staff from Romania, Ukraine, Hun-
      gary and Slovakia, it was established to further con-
      tinue the cooperation, in order to achieve their com-
      mon project "TISA", to sign the Intergovernmental
      Agreement and to execute a CPX in 2002, in Ukraine.